The “Pakistan Model” — A Recipe for an Unending War
Photo by Tasnim News Agency reporter
The residents of the southern suburb of the Lebanese capital Beirut woke up, on the night of April 1st, to a sound they wished to never hear again after the last war. Two Israeli missiles struck three floors of a building in the middle of the night, killing four people, a Hezbollah commander with his son, and two female neighbors. The first assassination in Beirut after the “ceasefire” was the most dangerous after a series of aggressions, claiming the lives of more than 30 individuals – most of them civilians – in less than a couple of weeks, including air and drone strikes targeting houses and cars in South Lebanon, south and north of the Litani River. Most of the assassinations happened when Hezbollah members were in their houses and villages, engaging in civilian activities with others present.
Since the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000, the Lebanese resistance has achieved a remarkable feat: it has effectively restricted Israel, its hostile neighbor, from operating freely on Lebanese soil—whether by land, air, or sea. Over the past 24 years, this accomplishment has brought Lebanon, particularly the south and the Bekaa Valley, more than two decades of relative stability, prosperity, and growth. This is no small feat in a region engulfed in turmoil, from Afghanistan to Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, and through the cascading crises following the “Arab Spring.” Even the 2006 war, which lasted 33 days, ended on the Lebanese Resistance’s terms. Israeli forces withdrew behind the Blue Line and largely refrained from targeting the resistance’s movements, equipment, and fortifications in the years that followed. This was widely seen as a decisive victory for the resistance and its strategy of safeguarding Lebanon. This status quo persisted even during a decade of Hezbollah’s intense battles against Al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups in Syria, which cost the resistance around 2,500 killed and 5,000 wounded.
For over two decades, the limitation of Israel’s operational freedom in Lebanon—or the inability to attack Lebanon at will—has been a persistent frustration for Israeli military leaders. On the few occasions when Israel attempted to breach these constraints, for example by way of scattered strikes in southern and northern Lebanon, or a single attack in the suburbs, Hezbollah’s swift and forceful responses served as a stark warning: the cost of war would be prohibitively high. This deterrence forced Israel to shift from overt military aggression to more covert security operations. Hezbollah, in turn, responded to these operations in various ways—some successful, like the 2013 Labbouneh ambush that targeted an Israeli commando force, or the 2023 Majeddo explosive device, or the exposure and dismantling of their spy networks. Yet, even the failed attempts sent a clear message to Tel Aviv: retaliation for security operations against the resistance was inevitable, effectively curbing Israel’s aggression.
Israel’s “Freedom of Aggression”
The concept of “freedom of action” in Lebanon began to gain traction in Israeli military discourse after the 2006 war, particularly following the findings of the Winograd Commission, which investigated Israel’s failures in that conflict. Israeli Air Force officers and military experts argued that the war’s outcome—a balance of power that prevented Israel from targeting Hezbollah for fear of a devastating missile response—was a strategic failure. This balance allowed Hezbollah to claim victory, a narrative that has shaped the region’s dynamics ever since.